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Abstract 
In June 2016, British voters took part in a referendum on the UK’s membership of the European 
Union (EU). By a margin of 52%:48%, they voted to leave. Studies have demonstrated that 
fixed demographic factors were the best predictors of voting intentions in either direction, or 
that ‘Leave’ voters were driven by perceived threats from immigration. In this paper, we 
examine the role of moral intuitions in referendum voting intentions. In Study 1, demographic 
variables did not predict voting intentions after adding psychological variables to our statistical 
model. Instead, voting ‘Leave’ was predicted by political conservatism, social change 
insecurities, and placing moral importance on personal liberty. In contrast, only an adherence 
to the care foundation of morality predicted ‘Remain’ voting. These findings were also 
reflected in linguistic analyses of campaign materials and news items (Study 2). We discuss 
these data in relation to common discourses around the Brexit vote. 
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The role of intuitive moral foundations in Britain’s vote on EU membership 
On 23rd June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) held a national referendum on its membership 
of the European Union (EU). By a margin of 52% to 48%, the resulting vote led to the 
triggering of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty in March 2017, indicating the UK’s formal 
intention to withdraw from its political bond with the rest of Europe. In this paper, we present 
two studies examining the referendum result with reference to the role of moral intuitions in 
voting choices.  
Moral foundations theory (MFT; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) offers a theoretical approach to 
understanding how moral intuitions guide our decision-making within the political domain. 
MFT was formulated by considering data from cultural and evolutionary psychology. There 
are three key principles underpinning MFT: (1) implicit moral judgements precede rational 
decision-making; (2) morality is a multi-dimensional construct; and (3) the relative 
importance attributed to respective moral dimensions is variable across the population. 
Haidt (2012) built on seminal work by Tversky & Kahneman (1974) to argue that 
intuitive cognition typically drives decision-making, with our conscious elaborations being 
post-hoc justifications of these intuitions. The notion that morality is multidimensional stems 
from Haidt and Joseph’s (2004) work on intuitive ethics. They first identified four such 
ethics, which they argued make up the majority of our moral intuitions: (1) preventing 
suffering, (2) respecting hierarchies, (3) acting reciprocally, and (4) behaving purely. In the 
ensuing years, six moral foundations have been identified (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Iyer, 
Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). These are care, fairness, loyalty, authority, purity, 
and liberty (see Table 1). 
 
[Insert Table 1 Around Here] 
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The endorsement of each foundation varies between political groups. On the initial five 
moral foundations, Haidt (2012) suggested that liberals demonstrate a ‘two-channel’ 
approach to morality, and value issues around ‘care’ and ‘fairness’ above all others. In 
contrast, conservatives endorse all five, placing loyalty, authority, and purity on an equal 
footing with these liberal impulses. The final foundation (liberty) was developed later by Iyer 
et al. (2012), with liberals scoring higher in the social domain, and conservatives score higher 
on economic indices. 
A small but coherent body of literature has developed since the EU referendum on the 
psychological antecedents to voting intentions. For example, Meleady, Seger, & Vermue 
(2017) reported how anti-immigrant sentiment and prejudice was a key predictor of voting 
‘Leave’, while contact with immigrants predicted voting ‘Remain’ via the process of 
reducing such prejudices. Similarly, Abrams and Travaglino (2018) reported how a 
combination of high levels of perceived threat from immigrants and low trust in politicians 
was associated with a higher propensity to vote ‘Leave’. Van der Vyver, Leite, Abrams, and 
Palmer (2018) examined the both person (e.g., conservatism) and social (e.g., identity) factors 
in pre-referendum voting intentions (N = 244) and post-referendum voting behaviours (N = 
197) to identify the psychological drivers of voting. They found that political conservatism 
predicted voting ‘Leave’ via ‘realistic threat’ perceptions (operationalised as the feeling that 
immigrants have too much political power). As such, the desire for a clear and consistent 
worldview supported by a sense of personal safety may be a driving force behind some 
‘Leave’ voter decisions. This is consistent with an ontological security approach to 
examining political attitudes and behaviours (for a review of this literature, see Giddens, 
1991; Laing, 1961). Theoretically, this has links to uncertainty management (van den Bos, 
2009) and system justification theory (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), in that the maintenance 
of social order and the continuity of social conditions are offered as (unconscious) 
5 
 
justifications for the oppression of minorities. We test this hypothesis directly in our current 
work. 
In this paper, we examine the moral intuitions of the ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’ campaigns 
and their voters in the EU referendum. Much of the popular debate around ‘Brexit’ has 
focused on the differences between ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’ voters in relation to specific 
domains, such as age, education, and prejudice. Further, those studies which have been 
conducted view the vote through the lens of needing to understand why people may have 
voted ‘Leave’. For example, Van der Vyver et al. (2018) grouped ‘Remain’ voters with those 
who were unsure/would not vote in order to predict ‘Leave’ voting behaviours. We were 
interested in taking a more ideologically-neutral approach to understanding the psychological 
predictors of the referendum vote on both sides. 
Drawing on common themes within the popular discourse surrounding the referendum 
itself, in Study 1 we examined the extent to which the moral foundations described above 
predicted vote intentions prior to the referendum. After controlling for demographic 
variables, we sought to replicate prior findings suggesting that political conservatism and 
perceived threats around social change were associated with a propensity to vote ‘Leave’ 
(Van der Vyver et al., 2018). However, we also predicted that higher endorsement of the care 
foundation would be predictive of a ‘Remain’ voting intention. This is due to one of the key 
debates around the referendum was related to the plight of refugees entering the continent, 
which taps into an impulse to protect society’s most vulnerable from potential harm.  
In contrast, we hypothesised that higher endorsement of the loyalty, authority, purity, 
and liberty foundations would be predictive of an intention to vote ‘Leave’ in the referendum. 
The first three of these foundations are associated with more conservative moral impulses 
designed to boost ingroup loyalty and to expel outgroups (a common theme among EU 
referendum discourses). That is, those who prefer homogenous social environments 
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(indicative of loyalty and purity themes) may wish to reduce levels of immigration from the 
continent by withdrawing from the EU. Those scoring high on the authority (indicative of a 
desire for strong leadership) and liberty (indicative of a desire for freedom) may also both 
support the ‘Leave’ campaign for reasons related to sovereignty. While these two ideas may 
seem to be juxtaposed, they may represent a desire for control (an authority theme) to be 
housed internally rather than externally (a liberty theme). We did not differentiate between 
economic and social liberty at this stage, as both should conceptually be linked to a vote to 
free the UK from external control of the EU. That is, economic libertarians should endorse a 
‘Leave’ vote in order to have control over British finances, while social libertarians should be 
averse to EU regulation in British life. We did not make any specific predictions in relation to 
the fairness foundation owing to its conceptual lack of clarity in the empirical literature, and 
the idea that fairness has been associated with both political liberalism and conservatism 
(Haidt, 2012). Further, we were unable to identify fairness-related themes in the social 
discussions about the EU referendum, making predictions difficult to make in relation to this 
construct.  
In Study 2, we sought to examine the presence of each of the moral foundations within 
official campaign news, such as to triangulate our data from Study 1. Our hypotheses for this 
analysis mirrored those for Study 1. That is, we expected to find a significantly higher 
proportion of ‘care’-related words in Remain campaign materials, and ‘loyalty’-, ‘authority’-, 
‘liberty’-related words in Leave campaign materials. 
 
Study 1 
Methods 
Participants.  Using the G*Power algorithm, a minimum sample size of 166 was 
required to detect medium-sized effects with 95% power. We purposively sought to over-
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sample to account for incomplete responses, and to be able to generalise our findings more 
broadly than a minimally-powered study would allow (e.g., Van der Vyver et al., 2018). In 
total, 668 people started our online survey. Of these, eight were removed as respondents did 
not meet the eligibility criteria for voter status, and 154 were removed due to incomplete data 
(indicating study withdrawal). This left a final sample of 506 (351 males, 153 females, 3 
participants did not disclose gender) aged 18-80 years (Mage = 33.37 years, SD = 13.87). This 
represents a 76% completion rate for eligible respondents who started the survey. Responses 
were collected between March-June 2016. 
Participants were recruited using targeted online advertisements to recruit as politically-
diverse a sample as possible. First, we targeted general community groups using Facebook. 
These posts were embedded into community groups spanning several regions of the UK and 
encompassed urban and more rural areas. Next, we used personal Twitter feeds to distribute 
the study link to a more professionally-based audience. Finally, we posted the study link on 
the biggest Reddit forums for each of the five main political parties in the UK (the 
Conservatives, Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the Green Party, and UKIP), as well as 
specific forums for discussing British politics and the EU referendum itself. All 
advertisements encouraged the sharing of the link to facilitate snowball sampling to occur. 
 
Measures. 
Demographic questionnaire.  Participants were asked to provide information about 
their sex, age, highest qualification, and political views (measured using a single item 11-
point scale, ranging from -5 to +5; negative scores = liberal, positive scores = conservative). 
 
Referendum voting intentions.  Participants indicated their referendum voting 
intentions using a forced-choice approach (‘Remain’, Leave’, or ‘Will not vote’). We 
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supplemented this with a Likert-style question about participants’ commitment to this voting 
intention, anchored from 0 (‘Not at all committed to this choice’) to 10 (‘Very committed to 
this choice’). We then computed a vote commitment score by coding the forced-choice 
question (‘Remain’ = -1; ‘Leave’ = 1), and then multiplying this by the commitment question 
score. This created a scaled variable, ranging from -10 (strongly committed to vote ‘Remain’) 
to +10 (strongly committed to vote ‘Leave’). The used of this scaled variable was also 
important to account for post-referendum discussions. That is, if particular moral impulses 
are strongly associated not only with a propensity to vote in a particular way, but also with a 
firm and unwavering commitment to that choice, these themes could be particularly 
important in the context of seeking to reduce the growing levels of political and social 
polarisation since the referendum took place (Lord, 2018). Using a binary outcome ‘Remain’ 
vs. ‘Leave’ variable in our analyses did not meaningfully change our results in this study (see 
Online Supplementary Materials). 
 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire.  We used the 32-item moral foundations 
questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2012) to examine participants’ endorsement of each of 
the five original moral foundations (care, fairness, authority, loyalty, and purity). The MFQ is 
comprised of six items per foundation, scored on a six-point Likert scale from 0 to 5. Two 
‘catch’ questions are also included to check that participants are paying attention to the scale 
when responding, and to encourage participants to use the extremes of the Likert scales. 
Average scores and Cronbach’s alpha (Table 2) for each foundation were computed using the 
syntax provided on MoralFoundations.org (the full scale is also available open-access at this 
address). 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
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Liberty foundation measure.  We used Iyer et al.’s (2012) nine items for measuring 
endorsement of the liberty foundation and distributed these randomly among the other MFQ 
items. Owing to the MFQ’s questionable internal consistency (particularly care and fairness), 
we first subjected these nine items to principal components analysis to establish whether they 
held together as a single factor (Table 3).1 After examining item loading coefficients, and 
considering advice on MoralFoundations.org, we decided to only consider factor one for our 
analysis of the liberty foundation. This is due to the small number of items in factors two and 
three making it difficult to obtain reliable estimates for these factors. Our six-item liberty 
foundation measure demonstrated good levels of internal consistency, and a significant 
difference between ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’ voters was observed (Table 2). 
 
[Insert Table 3 Around Here] 
 
Ontological Insecurities Scale.  We used the 14-item two-factor Ontological 
Insecurities Scale (OIS; <ANONYMOUS>, under review) in order to examine participants’ 
insecurities in relation to ‘social change’ (e.g., “The pace of social change is too quick”; α 
= .94) and ‘systemic inequality’ (e.g., “We live in a fair society”; α = .70). Each item is 
answered using a six-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly 
agree). Average scores are then computed for each factor. Each OIS factor taps into a 
construct that prior work has identified as being important in predicting Brexit voting 
intentions (see Van der Vyver et al., 2018). 
 
                                                          
1 This analysis was conducted as the MFQ has been used in a large number of existing papers, but the liberty 
measure has not. Thus, we felt more comfortable adapting the liberty measure (if required) and allowing our 
main MFQ data to stand to allow for direct comparison to other samples. We discuss issues related to the 
measurement of moral foundations towards the end of this paper. 
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Procedure.  Participants were invited to take part in an online survey study using the 
methods described above. Interested parties clicked on a link to the survey embedded in the 
study advertisement and were directed to an overview of the project. They were asked to 
explicitly indicate their informed consent prior to data collection. On the first page, 
participants completed the demographic questionnaire. They were then asked about their 
intentions to vote in the EU referendum, before completing the MFQ and OIS in a 
randomized order. 
This procedure received ethical approval from a departmental review committee prior 
to data collection. 
 
Results 
Data cleaning.  Participants were removed if they failed both of the MFQ ‘catch’ 
questions, or indicated that they were not planning to vote in the EU referendum. This 
process led to the exclusion of data from 96 participants, leaving 410 valid datasets (80% of 
the completed responses) for analysis. 
 
Moral foundations as predictors of Brexit voting.  We ran a series of between-
groups t-tests to examine whether there were differences in the mean levels of endorsement 
for each of the moral foundations between remain and leave voters (see Table 1). The results 
indicated moderate-to-large differences between the voter groups in relation to their 
endorsement of each of the moral foundations. Remain voters scored significantly higher on 
the care and fairness foundations, while leave voters more highly endorsed the loyalty, 
authority, purity, and liberty foundations. These broadly mirror prior differences reported 
between political liberals (similar to ‘Remain’ voters) and conservatives (similar to ‘Leave’) 
and are generally supportive of our hypotheses. 
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We next used a three-stage hierarchical linear regression approach to predict EU 
referendum voting intentions. We first entered the demographic variables of sex, age, and 
educational attainment. At stage two we added each of the moral foundations in order to 
examine the additive effects of these factors in predicting referendum voting intentions. At 
stage three we added our continuous political ideology variable, along with both factors of 
the OIS to the model to investigate whether these morality-based effects held while 
controlling for other known psychological predictors of the vote. In this analysis, participants 
with any missing data were excluded in a pairwise manner. Table 4 presents the zero-order 
correlations between each of our variables. For clarity of presentation, we present a narrative 
of these results below, with statistical information in Table 5. 
 
[Insert Table 4 Around Here] 
 
The model was significant at stage one, explaining 3.5% of the variance in EU voting 
intentions (F(3, 411) = 5.04, p = .002, R2 = .035). Increased age and lower educational 
attainment were significantly associated with an intention to vote ‘Leave’.  
The model at stage two was also statistically significant, explaining 30.7% of the 
variance in voting intentions (F(9, 405) = 21.41, p < .001, R2 = .307). After adding the moral 
foundations to the model, no demographic variables independently predicted voting 
intentions. However, higher endorsement of the purity and liberty foundations were 
significantly associated with an intention to vote ‘Leave’, while higher endorsement of the 
care foundation significantly predicted a ‘Remain’ vote. While the loyalty foundation trended 
in the expected direction (towards a tendency to vote ‘Leave’), this marginally failed to reach 
statistical significance (p = .051). 
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At stage three, the model remained statistically significant, and explained 46.8% of the 
variance in referendum voting intentions (F(12, 402) = 31.34, p < .001, R2 = .468). Here, the 
purity foundation fell out of the model as a significant predictor and was replaced by 
increased political conservatism and insecurities about social change (both in the direction of 
a propensity to vote ‘Leave’). Insecurities about systemic inequalities also trended towards 
predicting a ‘Leave’ voted, but did not meet the threshold for statistical significance (p 
= .054). Endorsement of the liberty and care foundations remained significant predictors in 
the expected directions (i.e., towards ‘Leave’ and ‘Remain’, respectively). 
 
[Insert Table 5 Around Here] 
 
Study 2 
In Study 2 we sought to conceptually replicate the presence of moral foundations within each 
referendum campaign by linguistically analysing the content of official campaign news and 
speeches. This gave us the opportunity to confirm that different moral foundations were 
important to either side of the referendum while addressing the sampling limitation in Study 
1. In doing so, we go further than previous work with non-representative samples (e.g., Van 
der Vyver et al., 2018) and seek to triangulate our self-reported data. 
 
Data sources 
We consulted with the webpages of the Electoral Commission’s officially-designated 
campaigns’ websites: ‘Britain Stronger In Europe’ (https://www.strongerin.co.uk/news), and 
‘Vote Leave’ 
(http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/key_speeches_interviews_and_op_eds.html). Stories 
were sampled if they were published after the official campaign designation, full-text 
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versions of articles and speeches were available for analysis, and the focus of the materials 
presented were positive (i.e., the articles or speeches were not simply critiques or attacks on 
the other campaign). This yielded a total of 140 stories for analysis (‘Remain’ n = 86, ‘Leave’ 
n = 54). 
 
Procedure 
LIWC (Pennebaker et al., 2007) was used to analyse the linguistic properties of the sources 
collected for Study 2. This software analyses digital written texts in relation to pre-defined 
linguistic characteristics. We adapted the moral foundations dictionary for LIWC (comprised 
of words and word stems that relate to care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity) to include 
terms related to the liberty foundation. We first created a new code for this foundation, and 
assigned this to 25 existing words or word stems within the dictionary (consistent with 
Graham and Haidt’s original approach). We then added 16 new words and word stems to the 
dictionary that were absent but uniquely related to the idea of liberty (Table 6). A score was 
computed to represent the proportion of each article containing words for each foundation. 
 
[Insert Table 6 Around Here] 
 
Results 
We conducted a one-way (Campaign: Remain vs. Leave) multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) to examine the different uses of the care, fairness, loyalty, authority, purity, and 
liberty foundations. A significant multivariate effect was obtained (Wilks’ λ = .75; F(6, 133) 
= 129.82, p < .001, partial η2 = .25). Material published by Vote Leave was comprised of 
significantly more words related to both authority (F(1, 138) = 40.38, p < .001, partial η2 
= .23) and liberty (F(1, 138) = 12.32, p = .001, partial η2 = .08), as compared to material 
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published by the Remain campaign. There were no significant differences between the 
campaigns’ use of any of the other moral foundations (Table 7). 
 
[Insert Table 7 Around Here] 
 
General Discussion 
Overview of key results 
In this paper, we have reported two studies examining the presence of moral foundations in 
the British referendum on EU membership in June 2016. In Study 1, we found that 
demographic characteristics associated with the Leave vote in polling data (e.g., older age 
and lower educational attainment) became non-significant once psychological factors were 
entered into our regression model. Instead, political conservatism, insecurities about social 
change, and an adherence to the liberty moral foundation significantly predicted intentions to 
vote ‘Leave’. The purity foundation was also associated with an increase in the likelihood of 
supporting ‘Leave’ before. This could be related to discussions about the European refugee 
crisis and immigration being common themes in the run up to the referendum, with those 
placing moral importance on purity being increasingly likely to want to eliminate those from 
different cultures (which may be associated with impurity) from the UK context. This effect, 
however, became non-significant upon the addition of ideology and ontological insecurities 
to the model, suggesting a potential mediating effect of these latter variables on the predictive 
validity of the purity foundation. In contrast, and as expected, higher endorsement of the care 
foundation of morality was the only significant predictor a greater likelihood to support 
remaining in the EU. 
These results question some of the popular commentaries we commonly see about the 
underpinnings of the EU referendum vote - particularly in relation to those who voted 
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‘Leave’. That is, we expected the loyalty foundation to be among the strongest predictors of 
this voting intention. The measurement of the loyalty foundation is comprised of items asking 
about “Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country” is an important 
moral concern, or if respondents agree with items such as “I am proud of my country’s 
history”. While an endorsement of this foundation trended towards predicting a greater 
propensity to vote to leave the EU in the stage two of our hierarchical regression, this 
prediction was non-significant, and became irrelevant once we added political ideology and 
ontological insecurities to the model. Rather than a deep sense of nationalism, a preference to 
vote ‘Leave’ appears to have been based around conservatism (which, admittedly, is 
predicted by a temperamental preference for firm category borders; Hirsch, DeYoung, Xu, & 
Peterson, 2010), insecurities about social change, and a desire for greater liberty. These data 
are consistent with previous work on Brexit (Van der Vyver et al., 2018), and have potential 
implications for communicating about the Brexit issue as the UK moves through the process 
of leaving the EU (and beyond). That is, there has been a noticeable movement towards anti-
EU parties across Europe in recent years. It could be that accusations of racism and 
isolationism do nothing but fuel a further division between those in favour of maintaining 
their country’s EU member status and those wanting to leave and alienates them from 
mainstream political discourse (consistent with Abrams & Travaglino, 2018). Using 
information related to moral foundations might help to heal such divisions, with interventions 
based on moral psychological processes offering potentially fruitful avenues for further 
research on nationalistic populism in the European context. 
When looking at the presence of moral foundations in campaign news and speeches 
(Study 2), these initial effects were broadly mirrored. That is, there were significantly higher 
levels of authority- and liberty-related language in material shared by Vote Leave than by the 
Remain campaign. While adherence to the authority moral foundation was not independently 
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a significant predictor of referendum voting intentions in Study 1, this may be a reflection of 
ingroup preference that is reflected in the OIS social change factor that did predicted a 
‘Leave’ vote. That is, OIS social change is highly correlated with right-wing 
authoritarianism, which is subsequently predictive of nationalistic sentiment (Harnish, 
Bridges, & Gump, 2017). One surprise was the lack of linguistic difference in ‘care’-based 
language by either campaign. However, endorsement of the care foundation is typically 
observed to be high across political boundaries, and as such an examination of between-
groups differences may not be expected to reach statistical significance (Haidt, 2012). 
 
Mapping the moral foundations within the Brexit campaign 
Our data suggest that incorrect polling predictions before the referendum may be due to 
polling typically ignoring non-conscious psychological motivations that may contribute to 
political decision-making in favour of demographic representativeness. Given the intense 
public debate around topics such as immigration in the lead up to the referendum (particularly 
in relation to the migrant crisis and its links to EU border control), differences in the moral 
impulses between ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’ voters are likely to have been brought to the fore. 
That is, broad differences in the moral intuitions of helping refugees (a ‘liberal’/’Remain’ 
impulse) and maintaining a strong and ontologically secure sense of national identity (a 
‘conservative’/’Leave’ impulse) are likely to have been given much coverage, which plays 
into both the strengthening of one’s own moral views and the stereotyping of those of your 
opponents. Further, the ‘Leave’ campaign’s proclamation of being about to control one’s own 
finances (best exemplified by the apparent mistruth about an additional £350million per week 
for British healthcare spending, rather than this sum being sent to the EU) may have tapped 
into a liberty-based drive for self-control. 
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What is perhaps most interesting from our data, though, is that the loyalty foundation 
(linked to the protection of ingroup identity) did not significantly predict an intention to vote 
‘Leave’. Instead, these voters were primarily driven (morally speaking) by an endorsement of 
the liberty foundation. The importance of this relates to the popular campaigning strategies 
used by both campaigns at the grassroots level in the run up to the referendum itself. While 
campaigners for a ‘Remain’ vote recruited a large number of academics and expert 
economists to make the case that Britain was “stronger, safer, and better-off” inside the EU, 
those attempting to mobilise people to vote ‘Leave’ had a simple intuitive message: “take 
back control”. Moral psychologists have written for several years that people tend to make 
highly-charged political decisions using intuitive processes, and then to rationalise these 
through verbal elaboration and justifications (Haidt, 2001). According to this framework, the 
most effective way to change somebody’s mind, or to convince them of a particular 
proposition, is to speak to their intuitions rather than their rationality. Examining the two 
referendum campaigns, it is clear that those aligned with the ‘Leave’ campaign held a better 
understanding about (a) the nature of moral psychology, and (b) the moral intuitions of 
undecided voters, than those involved with the ‘Remain’ campaign.  
 
Limitations and future directions 
Project-specific methodological issues.  There are some methodological limitations 
with our study that should be considered when interpreting the key findings. Firstly, we used 
a self-selecting opportunity sample by advertising the survey for Study 1 on open social 
media platforms. While this is not necessarily a substantial issue in itself, and is consistent 
with many published articles in this area, this approach does have the potential to introduce 
bias into both the sample and the data. For example, it has been documented that respondents 
to online surveys are typically younger and more politically liberal than the general 
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population. This was exemplified in the present study through an over-representation of 
‘Remain’ voters in the present sample as compared with the actual result of the referendum. 
To mitigate this limitation, we sought to conceptually replicate the effects obtained from self-
report methods by examining the moral foundations in campaign materials (e.g., speeches 
and news items). However, future studies may be advised to make use of managed panel 
recruitment initiatives for more balanced participant recruitment. 
Furthermore, our political orientation measure, which was one of the best predictors of 
EU referendum voting intentions among those in our sample, was comprised of a single item 
scale, anchored from ‘very liberal’ to ‘very conservative’. However, in light of recent 
political trends, and contemporary research into the nature of political ideologies, a more 
holistic approach might be to measure political orientation using multiple items incorporating 
both economic and social facets (Malka, Soto, Inzlicht, & Lelkes, 2014). When examining 
political orientation in future studies, it may be interesting to distinguish between the relative 
importance of social and economic conservatism in voting intentions. 
 
Evaluating the measurement of moral foundations.  While the MFQ and liberty 
measures performed generally as expected in relation to their relationships to voting 
intentions, we do have some concerns of the psychometric properties of these scales. In 
relation to the MFQ itself, we found that each of the foundations possessed suboptimal 
internal consistency coefficients. While this could be a by-product of our embedding the 
liberty questions in with the MFQ in Study 1, our observations about these coefficients are 
not anomalous to other published studies. For example, Graham et al. (2012) reported very 
similar Cronbach’s alpha coefficients to those found in the current sample, while an earlier 
iteration of the MFQ (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) reported alpha coefficients that were 
consistently below .70. In response to this, we have since undertaken a principal components 
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analysis of the MFQ, finding a five-factor structure (though only three of these factors appear 
psychometrically useful; see Online Supplementary Materials). With this is mind, future 
research might be inclined to focus broadly on refining the measurement of moral 
foundations. 
Similarly, we failed to replicate Iyer et al.’s (2012) two-factor model of liberty in our 
sample, with the direction of the scoring of some items in our factor analysis suggesting 
conceptual issues with the framing of the items used to calculate a score for this foundation. 
For example, the item “The Government should do more to advance the common good, even 
if that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals” was positively associated with 
the scale, meaning agreement with this was taken to indicate endorsement of the liberty 
foundation. While the face validity of the scoring is not 100% clear, the factor in the main 
does appear to be tapping into impulses related to liberty (four of the six items are explicit in 
this regard, and the final item references group norms and traditions (in contrast to individual 
liberty), which may implicate the reverse-scoring). Further, the factor did predict EU voting 
intentions in the expected direction. Nonetheless, further work is required to formalise, 
standardise, and validate the measurement of the liberty foundation. 
Thus, we argue that while the items making up the MFQ and liberty measures may in 
general be suitable for investigating moral foundations, they may not be optimal in doing so. 
The MFQ was developed using a relatively small number of items (Graham et al., 2012), and 
so a re-conceptualisation of the measure, using a much larger pool of potential items that also 
bring in themes related to liberty, may be a fruitful direction for research in this area of 
inquiry. This work should take a cross-cultural approach, such as to conform to the cultural 
and evolutionary nature of the core framing of moral foundations theory (Haidt, 2012), and 
facilitate the development of a more valid and internally consistent measure of these 
constructs. 
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Concluding remarks 
In sum, we would encourage those on both sides of the political divide to develop a better 
appreciation for the moral intuitions of their political opponents. Far from being “thick”, 
“racist”, “stupid”, or “idiots” (the first four descriptors to appear as auto-fill options for a 
Google search beginning with the phrase “Brexit voters are…” at the time of writing), those 
individuals who voted to leave the EU may have seen this as their opportunity to ‘take back 
control’ (a sentiment related to the liberty moral foundation) of their countries finances and 
sovereignty. Similarly, those on the other side of the vote placed moral value on care for 
those at the bottom of the social ladder, and were not “traitors” (the number one auto-fill 
option for a Google search beginning “Remain voters are…”). 
We have highlighted that moral intuitions play a key role in informing political 
decisions that are likely to have both immediate and long-term effects on a nation’s social, 
cultural, and economic prospects. A positive response to this finding would be to place an 
increased theoretical and practical importance on understanding these intuitive differences in 
order to promote compromise and constructive debate, and to begin to address the 
polarisation and division that we are experiencing in politics across a range of modern 
democracies. 
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Table 1. Overview of the moral foundations 
Foundation Definition 
Care The impulse to protect the vulnerable from harm (stemming from 
our evolutionary history of caring for offspring)  
Fairness The belief that inputs will be aligned with outputs, and that those 
who do good will be rewarded (associated with the law of karma) 
Loyalty  A sense of ingroup pride and affinity to one’s family or nation 
(stemming from our evolutionary history of tribal living) 
Authority An investment and respect for social hierarchies (associated with 
the belief that order can be maintained through fixed structures) 
Purity The striving to avoid pathogenic stimuli, such as rotten foods (now 
extended into the social domain and applied to ‘pathogenic’ 
activities, such as cross-cultural relationships and immigration) 
Liberty A desire to have self-determination and to be free from external 
control. Divided into ‘economic’ and ‘social’ facets 
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Table 2. Reliability coefficients and average foundation scores between voter groupings 
(Study 1) 
  Average score Significance testing 
 α ‘Remain’ ‘Leave’  t p 95% CI (difference) d 
Care 0.63 4.53 (0.69) 4.05 (0.87) 6.93 < .001 [0.35, 0.62] 0.61 
Fairness 0.63 4.78 (0.61) 4.34 (0.77) 7.02 < .001 [0.31, 0.56] 0.63 
Authority 0.75 3.12 (0.86) 3.77 (0.99) 7.72 < .001 [-0.81, -0.48] 0.70 
Loyalty 0.73 2.91 (0.78) 3.49 (0.90) 7.63 < .001 [-0.73, -0.43] 0.69 
Purity 0.81 2.41 (0.93) 2.94 (1.12) 5.76 < .001 [-0.71, -0.35]  0.52 
Liberty 0.73 3.83 (0.81) 4.52 (0.89) 9.06 < .001 [-0.85, -0.55] 0.81 
Note. Average scores represent mean values, with standard deviations presented in 
parentheses. 
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Table 3. Item loadings for Iyer et al.’s (2012) liberty foundation items (Study 1) 
 Factor 
Item 1 2 3 
Society works best when it lets individuals take 
responsibility for their own lives without telling them what 
to do 
.772 .035 -.190 
I think everyone should be free to do as they choose, so long 
as they don’t infringe upon the equal freedoms of others 
.684 .412 -.017 
The Government interferes far too much in our everyday 
lives 
.638 -.310 -.115 
People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy 
their wealth as they see fit 
.598 -.496 -.063 
The Government should do more to advance the common 
good, even if that means limiting the freedom and choices of 
individuals 
.558 .005 -.509 
People should be free to decide which group norms and 
traditions they themselves want to follow 
-535 .193 -.086 
Whether or not private property was respected .380 .652 -.098 
Whether or not everybody was free to do as they wanted .436 -.371 .617 
Property owners should be allowed to develop their land or 
build their homes in any way they choose, so long as they 
don’t endanger their neighbours 
.460 .433 .598 
Note. Loadings in bold indicate the factor to which that item belongs. Negative factor loading 
indicates that the item should be reverse-scored in subsequent analyses. 
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Table 4. Zero-order correlations between variables in the regression analysis 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. EU vote -             
2. Sex -.02 -            
3. Age -.13** .26*** -           
4. Education -.11* .02 .10* -          
5. Ideology .59*** -.03 .12** -.11* -         
6. OIS-1 .63*** -.03 .17*** -.09 .69*** -        
7. OIS-2 -.22*** .06 .04 .06 -.41*** -.26*** -       
8. Care -.29*** .36*** .13** -.05 -.34*** -.39*** .34*** -      
9. Fairness -.29*** .03 -.03 .02 -.46*** -.39*** .34*** .55*** -     
10. Loyalty .35*** .07 .17*** -.22*** .43*** .49*** -.19*** .07 -.11* -    
11. Authority .35*** .20*** .23*** -.18*** .56*** .54*** -.26*** -.00 -.19*** .69*** -   
12. Purity .30*** .27*** .29*** -.22*** .43*** .50*** -.10* .20*** -.12* .59*** .71*** -  
13. Liberty .38*** -.02 .03 -.14** .35*** .30*** -.34*** -.14** -.12* .39*** .19*** .12* - 
M - - 33.54 .60 -1.66 2.72 3.89 4.36 4.63 3.16 3.39 2.64 3.94 
SD - - 14.14 .49 2.78 1.21 .91 .81 .71 .90 .98 1.05 .89 
Note. EU vote represents the scaled vote commitment score; Sex = 0 (female) to 1 (male); OIS-1 = social change insecurities; OIS-2 = systemic 
inequality insecurities.  
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Table 5. Three-stage hierarchical linear regression predicting EU referendum voting intentions (Study 1) 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
Predictor B SE B β p B SE B β p B SE B β p 
Sex -1.01 .94 -.05 .285 .02 .89 .00 .985 1.03 .78 .06 .188 
Age .10 .03 .16 .002 .05 .03 .07 .094 .03 .02 .04 .271 
Education -2.21 .86 -.13 .010 -.33 .76 -.02 .677 -.74 .67 -.04 .269 
MFQ Care     -2.82 .61 -.26 < .001 -1.36 .56 -.13 .015 
MFQ Fairness     -.79 .62 -.07 .205 .58 .57 .05 .307 
MFQ Loyalty     1.14 .58 .12 .051 .47 .52 .05 .366 
MFQ Authority     .62 .61 .07 .305 -.62 .56 -.07 .266 
MFQ Purity     1.35 .52 .17 .010 -.16 .49 -.02 .733 
MFQ Liberty     2.56 .42 .27 < .001 1.71 .40 .18 < .001 
Ideology         .91 .18 .29 < .001 
OIS-1         2.77 .40 .39 < .001 
OIS-2         .79 .41 .08 .054 
Model overview R2 = .035, F(3, 411) = 5.04, p = .002 R2 = .322, F(9, 405) = 21.41, p < .001 R2 = .483, F(12, 402) = 31.34, p < .001 
R2 change   .287, F(36, 405) = 28.58, p < .001 .161, F(3, 402) = 41.74, p < .001 
Note. OIS-1 = social change insecurities; OIS-2 = systemic inequality insecurities. High scores on the outcome measure indicates a stronger 
intention to vote ‘Leave’. B = unstandardised beta-values; β = standardised beta-values. Significant predictors presented in bold. 
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Table 6. Words and word stems associated with the liberty foundation in the modified LIWC 
dictionary (Study 2) 
Existing words and word stems Additional words and word stems 
exploit free 
exploits freedom 
exploited liberty 
exploiting autonom* 
rights choice 
obey* choose 
obedien* liberate 
duti* liberation 
order* sovereign* 
supremacy independent 
control independence 
submi* dictat* 
serve totalitar* 
abide coerc* 
defere* authoritarian* 
defer tyran* 
defian*  
rebel*  
dissent*  
subver*  
disobe*  
defy*  
defector  
nonconformist  
protest  
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Table 7. Linguistic prevalence of moral foundations in campaign materials (Study 2) 
Foundation Remain Leave Statistics 
Care 0.75 (0.66) 0.61 (0.48) F(1, 138) = 1.87, p = .178, η2p = 0.01 
Fairness 0.22 (0.56) 0.24 (0.22) F(1, 138) = 0.07, p = .793, η2p < 0.01 
Loyalty 0.78 (0.65) 0.77 (0.48) F(1, 138) = 0.02, p = .896, η2p < .01 
Authority 0.38 (0.35) 0.79 (0.40) F(1, 138) = 40.38, p < .001, η2p = 0.23 
Purity 0.06 (0.16) 0.04 (0.08) F(1, 138) = 0.21, p = .649, η2p < 0.01 
Liberty 0.47 (0.50) 0.78 (0.50) F(1, 138) = 12.32, p = .001, η2p = 0.08 
Note. Values represent the percentage of campaign materials comprised of words related to 
each of the moral foundations (SD in parentheses). 
